Forced Liquidation of the Kokand Khanate
The tsarism, the patron of the Kokand khans, failed to restore either the power of Khudoyar Khan or Nasr-ed-Din Khan.
The imperial government, which had previously refrained from accepting the Kyrgyz, who inhabited the southern regions of Kyrgyzstan, as its subjects for tactical reasons, was now forced to liquidate the Kokand Khanate and annex its territory, including the southern part of Kyrgyzstan, to Russia on February 19, 1876, frightened by the scale and persistence of the uprising. This is stated in a letter from the Turkestan Governor-General Kaufman dated February 2, 1876: "Seeing no possibility of calming the population in any other way, His Imperial Majesty has consented to accept (the Kokand—K.U.) khanate into the allegiance of His Majesty"; i.e., Russia. On February 19, 1876, the Kokand Khanate and the southern part of Kyrgyzstan under its control were annexed to Russia. They formed the Fergana Region, which became part of the Turkestan Governor-Generalship.
Thus, the uprising of the Kyrgyz, Uzbek, and Tajik peoples from 1873 to 1876 objectively led to the liquidation of the Kokand Khanate and the annexation of its territory along with the areas under its control to Russia. This had a significant impact on the historical development of the aforementioned fraternal peoples.
Despite its massiveness, wide scope, and duration, the uprising, which was characterized by persistence, did not succeed. This can be explained by the weak organization, spontaneity, and poor armament of the rebels, the absence of unified leadership, a plan of action, and the limited political consciousness of the insurgents, as well as the betrayal by representatives of the feudal nobility and the superiority of the khan's and imperial regular punitive troops in terms of armament and organization. The defeat of the uprising is closely linked primarily to the internal social situation in the khanate. The uprising unfolded spontaneously, with its participants—the working class—naively attempting to rid themselves of feudal oppression by overthrowing the despised cruel khan and proclaiming a "good" khan in his place. The majority of the rebels reconciled themselves to the fact that a certain part of the uprising's leaders consisted of feudal nobility, who prioritized their own interests above all else, trying to direct the anti-feudal struggle of the masses along religious lines and, after the first serious setbacks, switched sides to the punitive forces. Ordinary rebels, having realized the selfish goals of their feudal allies, who had nothing in common with the main objectives of the uprising, significantly cooled, losing confidence and determination in their actions against the khan and the Kokand feudal lords and their patron, the imperial authority, even though they still had the opportunity to continue the liberation struggle. The treacherous actions of the feudal nobility contributed to the weakening and defeat of the uprising from 1873 to 1876.
The uprising under study was caused by feudal-khan oppression and was directed against the feudal nobility led by the khan and his patron and protector—tsarism. It had an anti-feudal and national liberation character. In terms of its massiveness, scope, and duration, this uprising was the largest movement in the history of the peoples of Central Asia until the early 20th century, when the revolution shook the entire country and the world. At the same time, in terms of its social composition, goals, and character, the uprising of interest to us constituted one of the complex historical events.
It covered the entire territory of the Kokand Khanate, the southern part of Kyrgyzstan, and a significant part of Tajikistan, including several districts that were part of the Turkestan Governor-Generalship. This uprising lasted for three years. Hundreds and thousands of rebels participated in it. Often, the number of insurgents reached 70,000 to 80,000 or more. There were cases when the number of freedom fighters exceeded 200,000. The participation of broad masses of Uzbek, Kyrgyz, and Tajik workers in the uprising of 1873-1876, who fought against feudal-khan oppression and its protector—the imperial authority—determined its massiveness, nationwide character, and persistence. In this regard, the following statement from an eyewitness of the uprising, the well-known orientalist Kuna A.L., is of significant interest. He writes: "The passions were externally calmed for a time, but the offended national sentiment, however, did not sleep. The month of August 1875 and the subsequent time showed how deeply the disease of general discontent against the khan and his entourage, who were suffocating the people with excessive taxes, bribery, and similar actions, had taken root." Even some high-ranking imperial officials could not deny the nationwide and mass character of the uprising under study. Thus, Kaufman, who closely monitored the course of this uprising and was the organizer and leader of the imperial punitive forces, noted in his remarks and objections regarding the article "On the Struggle of the Russians with the Kipchaks and Kara-Kyrgyz," published in the liberal newspaper "Golos," that the struggle was not with the khan, but with a popular movement that was not so easy to suppress... Never before in Central Asia had the Russian (imperial authorities—K.U.) experienced such a long and stubborn struggle.
We encountered an energetic fighter for the first time and learned that it is incomparably more difficult to fight the population than to fight the despots of the native khanates." It is not difficult to notice that in these lines there is a tone of anxiety, fear, and dread experienced by representatives of the imperial authority during the popular uprising of 1873-1876.
Public Execution of Pulat Khan (Mulla Iskak Asan Ogldy)