The invasion of illegal armed formations of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan into the southern part of the country in 1999 and 2000 served as a catalyst for the intensification of military construction. In order to improve the military organization of the state in threatened areas, border units were created and deployed. Rapid response units were formed within the Southern grouping of troops. However, analysts noted that the units and formations were poorly trained for combat operations in mountainous terrain, lacking aviation, communication means, technical border protection equipment, operational-strategic reserves of weapons, equipment, ammunition, and other material and technical resources, and that military infrastructure was underdeveloped, with intelligence being a weak link.
The ways and means to rectify the situation were outlined in the Military Doctrine of 2002. The main goal of military construction was defined as "the creation of small, mountain, compact, and mobile armed forces equipped with modern weapons and military equipment, provided with material resources for conducting military operations in high-altitude conditions, capable of ensuring the protection of territorial integrity, constitutional order, sovereignty, and the citizens of the state in a short time."
The construction of the Armed Forces of the Kyrgyz Republic is planned to be carried out in three stages in accordance with the tasks of ensuring military security and the economic capabilities of the state. The first stage, from 2002 to the year planned, involved improving the training of rapid response forces to counter the infiltration of armed groups of international terrorists into the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic. The second stage, from 2004 to 2007, focused on the preparation and maintenance of the Armed Forces capable of independently or as part of Collective Rapid Reaction Forces of the Central Asian region of collective security, performing tasks in local-scale armed conflicts after re-staffing and mobilization. The third stage, from 2008 to 2010, aimed at the preparation and maintenance of the Armed Forces capable of independently or as part of coalition armed forces of the member states of the CSTO, performing tasks in regional-scale armed conflicts.
Structurally, the armed forces consist of general-purpose forces, rapid deployment forces, immediate response forces, and state border protection forces (border service).
General-purpose forces form the backbone of the combat power of the Armed Forces of the Kyrgyz Republic, maintained in readiness for mobilization and operational deployment as part of pre-established groupings in threatened areas. They are intended to repel aggression from outside and expel the aggressor (large formations of international terrorism) from the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic, either independently or as part of coalition groupings of the armed forces of participating states.
Rapid deployment forces are kept in readiness for re-staffing and operational deployment in threatened areas to enhance the combat capabilities of immediate response forces and state border protection in any scale of border armed conflict, as well as to cover state facilities of significant strategic importance.
Immediate response forces consist of mobile units and special purpose units of the full composition of the Ministry of Defense, Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, National Security Service, Ministry of Emergency Situations and Civil Defense, and the National Guard (NG), and are maintained in constant readiness to perform tasks of covering the state border, ensuring the deployment of other forces, and localizing and destroying armed groups of international terrorists in the border zone in cooperation with state border protection forces.
According to the Military Doctrine, "...the defense of the state is built on the principle of mobilization readiness. It is based on the timely buildup of general-purpose forces in threatened areas, adequately to the level of military threat, through the regrouping of combat-ready troops from other areas, as well as on the basis of partial or full operational deployment of the Armed Forces of the Kyrgyz Republic." In this regard, military-trained resources are prepared during military service by conscription and contract through military departments at civilian higher educational institutions and during military gatherings.
The provisions of the Military Doctrine raise objections for the following main reasons.
First, small, compact armed forces will not be able to ensure the defense of the country in local and regional conflicts in the interpretation of these conflicts by the Military Doctrine, given the military superiority of neighboring states.
Second, small compact armed forces will not allow for mobilization deployment of troops, as they will not be able to withstand the enemy given the existing balance of power and resources with neighboring states.
Third, the formations and units of small mobile armed forces in the conditions of a mountainous theater of military operations (TVD), existing road infrastructure, and the presence of airborne units and formations in neighboring states will easily be blocked in mountain basins during their regrouping or when being transferred to the combat zone.
Fourth, given the existing surplus of conscription resources, small, compact armed forces, together with military departments, will not ensure 100% coverage in the training of military-trained resources, which is necessary in the conditions of demographic superiority of neighboring states. Military gatherings can only prepare specialists who already have initial military training.
Based on these objections, the Armed Forces of Kyrgyzstan will only be able to counter illegal armed formations.
Fifth, and this is the main point, the Military Doctrine relies on the practical experience of the Soviet Army and Soviet military strategy, which, in turn, is based on the experience of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. In its content, it is similar to the military doctrines of Russia and Kazakhstan and does not take into account the demographic component of the region, as well as the geographical, communication, resource, and other features of Kyrgyzstan.
Moreover, the doctrine does not specify the nature and methods of potential aggression, the methods of conducting military operations in possible types of wars and armed conflicts. Without this, it is impossible to:
• determine the forms of application of the Armed Forces in wars and armed conflicts and methods of armed resistance;
• select the types of weapons and military equipment necessary for armed resistance;
• determine the optimal structure of units and subdivisions;
• determine the overall strategy and tactics of troop actions;
• organize the training of troops in the necessary methods of armed struggle.
The events of March 2005 made adjustments to the plans for the development of the military organization of the state. In one of the television interviews, Defense Minister Lieutenant General I. Isakov stated the need to transition the Armed Forces to a contract-based staffing system. This will lead to the destruction of the system for training military-trained resources, which will require a rejection of the principle of mobilization readiness in the construction of the Armed Forces. The Armed Forces will not be able to increase their numbers due to the lack of necessary human reserves. As a result, the state will be forced to maintain an army necessary for wartime during peacetime. Currently, Kyrgyzstan does not have the means for this, nor are any foreseeable in the near future.