In accordance with the Military Doctrine, the implementation of military construction plans is planned to be financed through timely satisfaction of the needs for mobilization preparation of the economy, components of the Armed Forces in financial resources, material and technical resources, armaments, and military equipment based on the unity of supply norms and adopted prospective state programs for economic and financial provision in peacetime and wartime. This requires a quantitative increase in the military budget and its structural changes.
However, according to calculations by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), military expenditures of Kyrgyzstan remained at the same level after the adoption of the Military Doctrine, and even decreased in dollar terms.
According to the Ministry of Finance, there were no significant changes in defense spending subsequently. The total expenditures on national security and law enforcement in 2004 and 2005 were lower than the military expenditures of 2002 according to SIPRI calculations. Preliminary data for 2006 indicates that the situation remained the same.
The structure of the military budget of the Kyrgyz Republic is similarly unchanged. It includes the following expenditure items:
1. Salary for military personnel and wages for civilian staff.
2. Contributions to the social fund.
3. Travel expenses.
4. Purchase of equipment and materials.
5. Purchase of uniforms.
6. Medications.
7. Food.
8. Payment of utility expenses.
9. Transportation expenses.
10. Other expenses.
11. Capital repairs.
12. Benefits for the population (insurance expenses).
This structure fundamentally differs from the structure of military expenditures accepted in global practice.
Moreover, the military budget of the Russian Federation includes provisions for mobilization and non-combat training.
The military budget of the Kyrgyz Republic not only does not provide for, but also does not finance year after year the most important items of military expenditures for Kyrgyzstan — the procurement and maintenance of armaments and military equipment, combat training, reserve training, the creation of military infrastructure, and the development of military science. There are also no funds allocated for purely military training of other law enforcement agencies that are part of the Armed Forces of the Kyrgyz Republic.
Protected and, consequently, priority items of military expenditures of the Kyrgyz Republic are salaries, contributions to the Social Fund, food, and medications. At the same time, the share of protected items in military expenditures for law enforcement agencies involved in defense using armed struggle resources, according to the Law "On Defense," can exceed 80%.
A characteristic feature of the military budget of Kyrgyzstan is the underfunding of law enforcement agencies. Their needs are satisfied within 20-50%.
According to preliminary calculations, for 2006, it is planned to provide 1% of the needs of the Border Troops and 4% of the needs of the Internal Troops and National Guard in equipment and materials from the republican budget, 1.5% of the needs for transportation expenses, and 2.2% of the needs for the acquisition of property for the Ministry of Defense. For capital repairs, it is planned to allocate 0.2% of the financial resources needed for the Border Troops, while the request from the National Guard remains completely unsatisfied.
Under such circumstances, law enforcement agencies have been placed in conditions where their main goal has become the struggle for physical survival. As a result, the entire system of military security provision has been significantly weakened, unable to effectively fulfill the tasks of armed defense of the country. This conclusion is easily confirmed.
Due to insufficient funding, operational, combat, and mobilization training of command bodies and troops have been minimized, and as a consequence, the combat readiness of the Armed Forces has significantly decreased, as well as their ability to perform their intended tasks. This is most clearly seen in the example of military aviation. The lack of planned flight training has led to a loss of skills among flight personnel and a mass exodus of specialists. To train a tank mechanic-driver, $2,250 is required. The lack of sufficient funds for combat training makes conscription for military service meaningless, as its main goal — the preparation of trained reserves — is not achieved.
The Armed Forces of the Kyrgyz Republic inherited mainly outdated models of armaments and military equipment from the Central Asian Military District of the USSR (second category district). The average service life of armaments and military equipment is 20 years. The necessary average rate of technical renewal should be at least 4-5% per year. In the armies of developed countries, the share of modern equipment and armaments is 60-80%. In Kyrgyzstan, during its years of independent existence, the rearmament of the army has not been carried out. It can be asserted that at least 75% of armaments and military equipment are already unfit for combat use.
Moreover, the maintenance of, for example, one vehicle of a field group requires $200, while that of a transport group requires $2,142 per year. An armored personnel carrier for a combat group costs $837, while for a training-combat group it costs $9,750 per year. The lack of funds for the maintenance of armaments and military equipment has led to their accelerated physical aging and premature breakdown. Thus, the number of armaments and military equipment unfit for combat use is significantly increasing.
The lack of certain types of armaments and military equipment has had a significant negative impact on the effectiveness of troop actions in military campaigns of 1999 and 2000. Combined with insufficient troop training, this led to a sharp increase in military expenditures. In 1999, during the elimination of illegal armed formations, about 200 million soms (4.5 million dollars at the 1999 exchange rate) were additionally spent. According to A. Akayev, "... these funds were used for mobilization, the transfer of military units to the south of the republic, providing them with uniforms, food, and the purchase of ammunition and weapons."
Significant damage to the country's defense capability has also been caused by the fact that due to a lack of funds, military science is not developing, and scientific research and experimental design work are not being conducted. Although in similar conditions, the Center for Strategic Research under the President of the Republic of Tajikistan has successfully operated the Military Research Center established during the armed conflict. Its functions include, in particular, information and analytical support for the government and the Ministry of Defense, justification of military policy, military-economic and military-technical support for military construction. The Academy of Sciences of Tajikistan also actively participates in research in the field of military security.
The Military Scientific Center of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan has developed a draft Military Doctrine of the Republic of Kazakhstan, a concept for the development of military education, and a methodology for planning the construction of the Armed Forces, as well as prepared a regulatory framework for R&D during its existence. The Center publishes a military-theoretical journal of the Ministry of Defense, where problematic issues of military theory and practice are reflected.
Unfortunately, the author does not have reliable information about military scientific bodies in Uzbekistan. However, judging by the scale of military construction and available information, serious attention is paid in this republic to both theoretical research in the military field and the conduct of experimental design work aimed at creating its own military-industrial base.
In Kyrgyzstan, such an organization is absent. The Military Research Center of the Ministry of Defense, which could address such issues, has been disbanded. The Kyrgyz Republic relies on the justifications and conclusions of Soviet and Russian military science in the practice of military construction and military policy as a whole. However, military theory in Russia is oriented towards military-political and military-strategic goals, geographical conditions, and resource capabilities of its country, which are not comparable to the goals, conditions, and capabilities of Kyrgyzstan.
It is undeniable that in addressing military security issues, it is necessary to make maximum use of the achievements of foreign military science, but it cannot and will not fully meet the specifics of the country. Furthermore, resource and additional time constraints do not allow for experimentation and achieving set goals through trial and error. Under the current conditions, only optimal, scientifically justified military-political decisions should be made. The cost of mistakes made can be too high. Today, the development of domestic military science is an objective necessity.
Thus, the practiced system of financing expenditures not only does not ensure the strengthening of the country's defense capability but also makes the existence of the military organization of the state meaningless due to its extremely low efficiency.