The agenda raises the question of which future model to choose: logistics between China and Europe or participation in circumventing sanctions.
The increasing sanctions pressure on Russia's financial system, combined with the development of the Middle Corridor, fundamentally changes the economic architecture of the continent. For Central Asian countries, the issue is no longer limited to diplomatic maneuvering but becomes a choice between integration into transparent logistics chains between China and Europe or playing the role of a gray intermediary in circumventing sanctions, which will have serious consequences.
The recent decision by the European Union to include Russia on the list of high-risk jurisdictions for money laundering effectively initiates a regime of strict control over any financial operations with a Russian footprint. In this context, the statement by the President of Kazakhstan regarding opaque transactions amounting to $14 billion that passed through one of the banks is not an exception but part of a larger problem. He noted that this concerns not only commodity flows but also convoluted financial schemes disguised as "internal regulation."
Kazakhstan, as the largest economy in the region, has long been viewed as a natural financial hub for the future corridor. However, in practice, the country is increasingly dependent on energy, logistics, digital, and financial factors. Control over oil transit, the import of fuel and lubricants from Russia, the vulnerability of internet traffic, and the implementation of solutions related to sanctioned Russian entities create long-term risks.
A striking example is the regulation of the gambling and betting sector. Under the pretext of "transparency" and "combating the shadow economy," a unified betting accounting system — the EBU — was created in Kazakhstan. As reported by Agents.Media, citing deputies and sources from the betting sector, the contract for implementing this system was awarded to a company linked to Umar Kremlov's circle. The founder of this company calls himself Kremlov's "brother," and critics argue that this has allowed his associates to control financial flows in the betting market.
Deputy Bakytzhan Bazarbek raised the issue that behind the facade of the EBU lies the transfer of control over cash flows and data to a private company connected with Russian interests. Despite these alarming signals, the system was implemented, and the risks of secondary sanctions effectively fell on Kazakhstani banks operating in this area.
In contrast to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan faced similar attempts to implement Russian financial and digital solutions but, in some cases, chose a different path. Attempts to integrate structures related to VTB and Russian regulators into the country's legislation did not gain support. Similarly, the situation with "Alfa Telecom" ended: arguments concerning information security and public discussion in the Jogorku Kenesh led to the nationalization of the operator, despite external pressure.
However, this does not mean that Kyrgyzstan has avoided difficulties. Sanctions against "Keremet Bank," restrictions on Capital Bank, and issues with crypto networks have significantly undermined the country's reputation. However, these events became a catalyst for revising financial policy. Banks tightened control, began to check not only formal counterparties but also ultimate beneficiaries, following OFAC and European regulators' standards.
Today, Europe clearly indicates that the Middle Corridor is not just a route for cargo but a financial ecosystem where there is no place for schemes servicing sanctioned economies. In this context, countries that integrate Russian financial solutions risk finding themselves outside the new continental project.
Kyrgyzstan is currently balancing between the past and the future. But the lack of deep integration with sanctioned financial mechanisms provides the country with the opportunity to become not a gray transit zone but part of a new architecture of trust.
