Possible conflicts with Iran have the potential to turn the country into a source of international instability. If the Islamic Republic loses power, it will lead to the exacerbation of various issues such as terrorism, the formation of armed groups, an increase in crime and smuggling, as well as migration flows, which will affect not only neighboring states but ultimately Russia and European countries, which are allies of the United States. However, such a scenario depends on Tehran's ability to maintain control over the situation. According to Nikolai Sukhov, a leading researcher at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies of the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations and a professor at the Institute of Oriental Studies and African Studies at HSE in St. Petersburg, there are chances for this, as he analyzes:
How Iran may threaten international stability
Historical examples show that instability in the region arises not from ideological statements, such as the recent remarks by Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi about a holy war against the USA and Israel, but as a result of a combination of several factors:
weakening of central authority;fragmentation of power structures;economic crisis.
Such processes have been observed in Iraq after 2003, in Syria since 2011, and partially in Libya. Whether Iran will be a source of terrorist threats and migration instability largely depends on how its post-war regime is organized.
If the state maintains its integrity, even in a harsh form, it will lead to some tension but will not undermine stability in the region or cause a rise in terrorism.
With centralized governance, the likelihood of the emergence of transnational terrorist groups remains low. The Iranian security system has a high degree of organization and professionalism. Even despite an aggressive ideological foreign policy, control over violence has been exercised through managed proxy structures rather than through destructive jihadism.
However, if there is a collapse of centralized authority or a split in power structures, such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the risks will significantly increase:
some armed forces may become independent;regional groups representing national and religious minorities may radicalize;under sanctions and a devastated economy, criminal activity will rise;cross-border smuggling of weapons and people will intensify.
It is important to note that Iran is not a classic example of a "failed state." There is a developed administrative structure, a high level of urbanization, and a strong national identity, which reduces the likelihood that the country will become an exporter of global terrorism. A more likely risk than the rise of international terrorism may be the migration burden: in the context of an economic crisis and political instability, many citizens, especially the youth, will seek to leave the country.
Who will bear the brunt
If a collapse of power occurs in Iran, the main consequences will be felt by Turkey, the countries of the South Caucasus, and Central Asia, as well as the monarchies of the Persian Gulf.
Turkey, in particular, will become a key buffer for Iranian migration to Europe, as it was during the Syrian crisis. The main flow of refugees will go through Turkey, which will also lead to an increase in arms smuggling and human trafficking. Although Turkey has experience managing migration flows, public fatigue from migration is accumulating, which may lead to border closures or negotiations on controlling flows, resulting in limited migration to Europe.
The likelihood of terrorist export to Turkey is moderate, and it will occur more through peripheral radical networks than through centralized Iranian channels. Direct terrorist acts in Europe or Turkey are unlikely unless these countries become involved in military actions against Iran: the Islamic Republic has traditionally acted selectively and not chaotically. The most real threat to Turkey may be the intensification of Kurdish separatism.
Another direction of instability will be the countries of the former Soviet Union, which will also affect Russia. Destabilization may occur in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan due to their common border with Iran, while the other countries in the South Caucasus and Central Asia will face secondary flows of refugees and smuggling.
Russia is unlikely to become a primary destination for migration from Iran: cultural and language barriers are higher than in the case of Turkey or Europe. Our country may be affected indirectly through instability in neighboring countries. The export of terrorism to Russia is possible only with a strong collapse of Iran and the formation of autonomous radical networks.
The monarchies of the Persian Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, are also at risk. However, in their case, it is not about migration threats related to crime and terrorism, as these countries strictly control entry. They are more likely to face attacks and sabotage from agents of former Iranian proxy networks that may go out of Tehran's control and begin to act independently.
As for the main culprits of a possible crisis, the geographical factor plays an important role: this is why the USA has never faced Middle Eastern migration on the scale of Europe. Although there is theoretically a threat of terrorism to the USA, the likelihood is low: it is not 2001 anymore, and logistical access from Iran to the USA is very complicated, while American intelligence agencies have extensive experience in combating external threats.
The main consequences of Middle Eastern crises for the USA have often manifested not in the form of migration flows but through the intensification of anti-American sentiments, the growth of regional conflicts, and the need for a prolonged military presence. If Tehran cannot maintain power, we will see all these problems again.
