The discussion about the transit of power in Kazakhstan has become more active, despite the fact that there is still a lot of time left until Tokayev's presidential term ends. This was triggered by his proposal to abolish the Senate and strengthen the Mazhilis. Many saw this as a signal that Tokayev, after leaving the presidency, could take on a key role in the new parliament to maintain his influence over the country.
However, it is unclear who might become his successor. All potential candidates, as soon as they start being perceived as possible successors, face removal—likely to avoid premature discussions about the transit.
In his Address to the People of Kazakhstan on September 8, 2025, Tokayev proposed to hold a referendum in 2027 on transitioning to a unicameral parliament. The goal is to strengthen legislative power and reduce the super-presidential system, which he identified as a priority after the January 2022 protests caused by public fatigue with Nazarbayev's long rule.
The proposal to abolish the Senate came as a surprise, as Tokayev himself had held the position of its chairman for nearly ten years, and in 2019 he became president from that position. The Senate speaker, according to the constitution, holds the second position in the state and can perform the duties of the president in case of his incapacitation.
Nevertheless, Tokayev indicated that the Senate had fulfilled its historical role by maintaining a balance between regions in the early years of independence. Now, according to him, Kazakhstan has become a stable unitary state, and the interests of various regions are sufficiently represented in the Mazhilis.
Kazakhstan's society received the proposal to abolish the Senate calmly. This chamber was not respected and rarely opposed the president or the government, serving as a tool for implementing their will. Nursultan Nazarbayev, the first president, received the title of Elbasy with its help, which ensured him immunity and influence even after leaving office.
Most of the restrictions associated with the title of Elbasy were lifted under Tokayev, and after the 2022 protests, the Senate began to be perceived as an anachronism. The abolition of the chamber seems a logical step in the context of dismantling the old system and weakening the influence of regional elites, which could pose a threat to Tokayev's power.
The situation with strengthening the Mazhilis is more complex. Officially, it is presented as a step towards democratization, but the real goal may be different. Tokayev proposes elections for deputies based on party lists, which he believes should develop the party system. However, all registered parties are controlled by the authorities, and this restriction on the participation of independent candidates will only increase the parliament's dependence on the executive power.
Reform Under Control
The Mazhilis could actually strengthen if Tokayev, after completing his presidential term in 2029, heads it and begins to expand its influence. Many Kazakhstanis interpret this proposal as preparation for the transit of power, as Tokayev must leave office according to constitutional amendments.
This scenario is not new: a similar approach was taken by former Turkmen president Berdymukhamedov, who, after transferring power to his son, headed the parliament himself and restored his influence. This would allow Tokayev to avoid the mistakes made during Nazarbayev's transit and concentrate power not around specific figures, but around institutions. However, there is still a lot of time until 2029, and the situation in the country may change.
The history of previous power transitions shows that even well-thought-out plans can collapse. Nazarbayev, by appointing Tokayev as his successor, hoped to maintain influence, but the protests of 2022 dashed those plans.
Nevertheless, Tokayev could change the constitution and seek a new presidential term, considering that his control over the political system has strengthened. Increased pressure on journalists, arrests of activists and opposition figures, refusals to register independent parties—all of this indicates that the president, despite his image as a reformer, is not inclined towards real liberalization.
However, such an approach contradicts Tokayev's image as a moderate and rational leader who does not cling to power and is ready to leave when the time comes. The principle of a single seven-year term has become a symbol of his break with the era of Nazarbayev, and revising it would appear as a rejection of the concept of a "New Kazakhstan."
Cleaning Up Successors
Nevertheless, with Tokayev's departure from office, the question of a successor inevitably arises. To avoid premature speculation and the emergence of alternative centers of influence, Tokayev conducts regular purges within his circle.
One of the most high-profile cases was the recent dismissal of Murat Nurtleu, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was a close associate of Tokayev. Their cooperation began back in the 2000s when Tokayev headed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Later, Nurtleu became his assistant and then the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
It was said that Nurtleu could become Tokayev's successor, and his unexpected dismissal came as a shock. Various versions of the reasons for his dismissal have circulated—from involvement in illegal schemes to complicity in the murder of a journalist. Although these accusations were not officially confirmed, they intensified his departure. Formally, Nurtleu remained within the system, but it resembles more of an honorary exile.
Despite the oddity of the rumors about Nurtleu, it is clear that his removal aimed to reduce tension within the system and prevent discussions about succession. This dismissal is part of a series of similar actions, as Tokayev has replaced the Minister of Defense, several advisors, and regional akims over the past year.
All of this indicates that Tokayev seeks to approach 2029 without the emergence of new centers of influence. Perhaps he genuinely wants to reduce the system's dependence on specific individuals. However, the methods he employs retain all the shortcomings of Kazakhstani authoritarianism: changes remain opaque and imposed, complicating real public discussion and limiting independent political activity. In such conditions, democratic renewal is unlikely: a system accustomed to a vertical power structure is more likely to continue reproducing old schemes, where decisive roles are played not by institutions, but by specific individuals.
