The dismissals with the wording "released from office by presidential decree" have become a common occurrence in Kazakhstan for ministers and high-profile officials who have worked for less than a year. Usually, there are no official comments, which raises questions: is this a targeted renewal of power or evidence of instability in government structures? This was reported by Azattyk Asia.
PERSONNEL TURBULENCE
At the UN General Assembly in New York, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev stated that countries with large energy resources cannot fully embrace the "green" agenda. Upon returning to Astana, he dismissed his advisor and special representative for international environmental cooperation, Zulfia Suleimenova, who held this position for two years — a significant term for a civil servant.
Before becoming an advisor, Suleimenova was the Minister of Ecology and Natural Resources — her term lasted only eight months, and prior to that, she worked as a deputy minister in the same department for just ten months.
In 2023, Tokayev, while introducing members of the Cabinet at an event, proudly mentioned that the government includes "young officials in their thirties," among whom were Suleimenova and another minister, Askhat Oralov, who was appointed head of the Ministry of Culture and Sports at the age of 32. He also served for eight months.
Ministers who have served briefly include not only the youth. Syryma Sharipkhanova was appointed head of the Ministry of Emergency Situations in June 2023 at the age of 59, but remained in this position for less than eight months.
49-year-old Nurlan Baibazarov held the position of Minister of National Economy and Deputy Prime Minister for ten months. He was dismissed at the end of 2024.
Kanat Sharalpaev, who headed the Ministry of Industry and Construction at 41, worked for about a year and a half, and in February 2025 was appointed assistant to the president for economic issues, but held this position for only seven months.
In October of this year, Tokayev dismissed the head of the internal policy department of the presidential administration, Abzal Nukhenov, who held the position for only seven months. However, Nukhenov did not remain unemployed: he became the deputy akim of Almaty. The official statement from the akimat states that the mayor, Darkhan Satybaldy — who himself came to the post from Akorda, where he was deputy head of the administration for only four months — appointed Nukhenov as his deputy "in agreement with the administration" of the president.
Political scientist and director of the Risk Assessment Group Dosym Satpaev notes that under President Tokayev, there is chaos in the government apparatus, while under Nazarbayev, there was a certain stability within the elite, formed by the long rule of the first president.
— During Nazarbayev's time, a circle of political players was formed: those who were in his circle for many years, — says Satpaev. — Tokayev is now creating his own circle, including new people who were with him earlier, including during the January events. He is trying to appoint people who were not previously public figures to leadership positions. However, the problem is that Nazarbayev created a system with negative selection. Already in the 2000s, there was a decline in personnel potential: loyalty was placed above professionalism. Now we see a second wave of negative selection, where less qualified specialists are coming to leadership positions, which negatively affects the quality of public administration.
Satpaev believes that the government lacks clear development plans for the next five to ten years, and the absence of a strategy leads to a team being formed for specific tasks that often change, which also affects the personnel composition.
PERTURBATIONS IN THE KNB
Dismissals are occurring not only in civil structures but also in the security block. Recently, Kanatay Dalmatov was relieved of his duties as deputy chairman of the National Security Committee after serving only one year and six days.
There is instability in the KNB following the events in January. Authorities arrested Karim Massimov and his deputies, accusing them of attempting a coup and colluding with criminals (the trial of the former leadership was held behind closed doors, and details are unknown). In early 2022, Tokayev appointed new people to the committee, but many of them did not last long.
Murad Nurtleu, a close associate of Tokayev, served as the first deputy chairman of the KNB for less than a month.
In the summer and autumn of 2024, Tokayev dismissed several deputy chairmen of the KNB: Marat Kolkobaev, Zhanat Elimanov, Askar Amerkhanov, who was also the director of the foreign intelligence service, Ruslan Seisembaev, and Bakytbek Kozhanov. All, except for Kolkobaev, worked for about a year or less. Elimanov was returned to the financial monitoring agency, where he worked before joining the special services, and no information was provided about the appointments of the others or the reasons for their dismissals.
When Amerkhanov, appointed deputy chairman of the KNB after the events in January, received the parallel position of director of the foreign intelligence service "Syrbar" in 2024, it was perceived as a promotion. However, his unexpected dismissal in September of the same year caused confusion. Rumors linked his departure to the murder of Kazakh opposition journalist and political émigré Aidos Sadykov in Ukraine. He was shot outside his home in Kyiv, where he had lived with his family for the past few years.
The investigation in Ukraine named two citizens of Kazakhstan, Meyram Karataev and Altai Zhakhanbaev, as suspects, who, according to the investigation, left the country immediately after the crime was committed. Journalists established that these individuals may have connections to the KNB, but the agency stated that they do not have such employees. Karataev was declared wanted, while Zhakhanbaev, according to the Prosecutor General's Office, turned himself in to the police, but no information about his prosecution has been reported.
[b]RESIGNATIONS TO "REDUCE PROTEST POTENTIAL"?[/b>
A year after Amerkhanov's dismissal, he found himself in the spotlight again. In early autumn, the internet resource Orda.kz published information about the detention of several high-profile officials. The editor-in-chief of the publication, Gulnara Bazhkenova, reported that along with Amerkhanov, Altai Zhakhanbaev and Meyram Karataev were also detained, as well as businessman Gadji Gadzhiev, whom she referred to as the "overseer" of the Kazakhstan-China border.
However, public attention was focused on another figure, Murat Nurtleu, who at that time held the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister. According to Bazhkenova, Nurtleu, after working less than a month as the first deputy of the KNB following the January events, created a shadow structure that used the committee for its own interests, engaged in surveillance and persecution of dissenters, and organized smuggling from China, and was involved in the murder of journalist Sadykov.
Government agencies denied the reports from Orda.kz, but no legally formalized claims were made against Bazhkenova.
Several weeks later, Tokayev dismissed Nurtleu from his position as minister and deputy prime minister, where he had worked for over two years. Dosym Satpaev considers Murat Nurtleu's resignation to be a consequence of "internal political conflicts related to the preparation for the transition of power."
— If we abstract from the political component and look only at the economic aspects, frequent changes in government reduce the country's attractiveness for investors, as working in conditions of uncertainty creates difficulties, — says Satpaev. — This also negatively affects Kazakh business, which is expecting changes in the rules of the game with the arrival of a new prime minister or minister of the economic block. Ultimately, this reflects on the economy, worsening its condition, which again forces the president to change people because he believes they have not fulfilled their duties.
In Satpaev's opinion, the authorities are beginning to realize that, in addition to beautiful promises of a "new" and "just" Kazakhstan, proclaimed after the events in January, it is necessary to demonstrate real effectiveness to society. "The refrigerator beats the television."
— The refrigerator has become the determining factor, but the authorities cannot fill it and are trying to reduce protest sentiments through personnel changes, presenting them as steps to address problems, instead of addressing the essence of the government apparatus itself. It is unlikely that the authorities have a complete understanding of the scale of the problem, but considering events in other countries where protest sentiments are rising, the instinct for self-preservation forces them to think about how to maintain stability before the start of the transition of power, to prevent a repetition of the events of January, — concludes the political scientist.
