In response to the growing discontent in Central Asia regarding Chinese influence, Beijing is initiating efforts to create a more positive image in the region. One of the key tools for this has become vocational education. In particular, during a meeting between Xi Jinping and Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in September, China announced the opening of two new "Lu Ban Workshops" in Kazakhstan.
Despite the romantic name, the "Lu Ban Workshops" are modern educational centers that prepare specialists in high-demand fields such as artificial intelligence, logistics, electric vehicle maintenance, hydropower, and automation. Over the past two years, China has established a network of such centers in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, named after the legendary Chinese carpenter.
Thus, Beijing aims to win the trust of the youth and help Central Asian countries enhance their competitiveness. Investments in the education system are also intended to change the perception of China, which has long been associated only with resource extraction and construction.
Image Change
The "Workshop" initiative, launched in 2016 with the support of the Tianjin municipal government, has several objectives. On one hand, these centers are meant to promote Chinese technologies; on the other hand, they serve as part of China's global strategy to improve its image. They complement the "Belt and Road" initiative, under which humanitarian aspects have long remained secondary to infrastructure projects.
Supported by Xi Jinping, the "Workshop" program could become an important tool of China's soft power in Central Asia. However, there is a rising wave of anti-Chinese sentiment in the region: from 2018 to 2020, numerous protests against Chinese mining companies occurred in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, whose activities negatively impact the environment. There is also discontent over the potential sale of land to Chinese investors.
The protesters are not limited to nationalist groups; workers, students, and activists dissatisfied with the opacity of Chinese activities are joining them. Some protests have been so large that authorities have abandoned certain projects with Chinese partners.
Additional grievances against Beijing include issues such as "debt diplomacy" and the oppression of Muslims in Xinjiang. The "Lu Ban Workshops" may help shift public attention from controversial projects to human capital development and high-value-added investments, which should reduce criticism regarding dependence on Chinese labor.
Adaptation to Local Conditions
The pace of establishing the "Workshops" is impressive. In Kazakhstan, where anti-Chinese protests have become regular since 2016, three new centers have opened in the last two years, and two more are under construction. Each center takes into account the needs of the host country, allowing China to stand out against the backdrop of Western donors, who often impose their conditions.
In Astana, the L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University hosts a "Workshop" on artificial intelligence, while the East Kazakhstan Technical University has one on logistics. The Tashkent "Workshop" participates in implementing the state strategy "Digital Uzbekistan - 2030," and in Dushanbe, where the first "Lu Ban Workshop" in the region opened in 2022, over 1,500 students have completed courses in geodesy and urban infrastructure.
A new center is also planned to open in Turkmenistan at the International Oil and Gas University named after Yagshygeldi Kakayev, which makes sense given that China accounts for more than half of Turkmenistan's gas exports.
Unlike Confucius Institutes, which have been criticized for imposing a Chinese narrative, the "Lu Ban Workshops" offer a more pragmatic approach. These centers provide certified skills in areas prioritized by local economies.
Thus, students from Central Asia gain access to high-tech industries dominated by foreign specialists, while Beijing familiarizes the region with its technological standards and educational norms.
Dependency Risks
Despite the advantages for Central Asian countries, such cooperation also entails risks, increasing dependence on China. Many educational programs for the "Lu Ban Workshops" are developed and implemented by Chinese institutions using Chinese equipment and software. For example, in Kazakhstan, the electric vehicle maintenance program is fully supervised by the Tianjin Vocational Institute, and training is conducted under the guidance of Chinese specialists.
As a result, a technological ecosystem dependent on China is formed: Chinese companies, equipment, and standards become important elements of national development strategies. This raises questions about whether Central Asian countries can maintain long-term technological autonomy, especially if Chinese programs do not always meet their needs.
From China's perspective, training local specialists in the "Workshops" contributes to creating a more sustainable model of interaction. The emergence of a layer of students and civil servants who have benefited from Chinese initiatives makes them more positively inclined towards cooperation with Beijing.
Changes in China's approach to Central Asia reflect a broader adjustment of its international strategy. The "Lu Ban Workshops" represent an attempt to influence other countries through bilateral ties and social capital, rather than solely through infrastructure projects.
It is unclear whether the negative perception of China in Central Asia will disappear, but it is already evident that Beijing is learning to adapt. The era of aggressive economic intrusion is shifting towards more subtle strategies, where alongside resource extraction and infrastructure construction, emphasis is placed on education and human capital development. China's public behavior is becoming more restrained, which may be key to success in Central Asia.
Source: storage.googleapis.com
