
According to the report, in 2025 there were 212 major cases of blockages affecting 28 countries, with a total duration of communication restrictions exceeding 120,000 hours — a 70% increase compared to 2024. It is expected that 798 million people fell victim to these restrictions.
It is important to note that this is not just about a complete internet shutdown. The report highlights different types of interventions: complete shutdowns, blocking of individual platforms, and significant traffic throttling to levels close to 2G, where only voice calls and SMS remain accessible, making the use of modern services nearly impossible. In 2025, there were recorded 55,700 hours of complete shutdowns, 54,000 hours of social media blockages, and 12,700 hours of traffic throttling. The latter category accounted for about 10% of all hours of violations and returned to the practice of censorship on a significant scale.
The greatest economic damage, according to estimates, was suffered by Russia — $11.9 billion. Next on the list were Venezuela ($1.91 billion) and Myanmar ($1.89 billion). The report examines the restrictions in Russia in detail, which reportedly began in May and were characterized not by a single shutdown, but by a series of technical interventions. One of the most notable methods was the use of the "16 KB curtain": access to certain resources, including those hosted on Cloudflare, was restricted so that only the first 16 kilobytes of data were loaded. Formally, the connection exists, but most modern websites become nearly inaccessible. Assessing the damage from such measures is difficult, and the authors describe this assessment as approximate.
When looking at blockages by platform, in 2025 the most time was spent blocking X (Twitter) — 18,354 hours, followed by Telegram — 16,990 hours and TikTok — 14,646 hours. The report also provides examples of how prolonged blockages "accumulate" hours throughout the year, and how instead of a sharp ban, authorities prefer a gradual deterioration of service quality. An example is the restrictions on WhatsApp in Russia: first, the limitation of individual functions and protocols (including calls), then an expansion to different types of connections, which ultimately makes the service practically non-functional for most users.
The authors emphasize an interesting shift in the reasons for shutdowns in 2025. For the first time, the main reason was restrictions on "information control," which turned out to be the most costly and lengthy. Exam-related shutdowns, although occurring frequently, appeared less significant in monetary terms, as they usually lasted a short period. Some countries became more cautious and precise in their actions, reducing collateral damage, but the overall trend of the year indicates a deterioration of "internet freedom" and an increase in the share of preventive restrictions.
The methodology for counting is based on the NetBlocks COST tool and includes data from the World Bank, ITU, Eurostat, and the U.S. Census Bureau. The authors note that social media blockages lasting more than 365 days are not included in reports as "permanent censorship," as users begin to switch to alternative platforms, and the economic effect changes. Therefore, old long-term bans in Russia do not add new "hours" to the annual statistics.
The main conclusion of the report is that internet shutdowns are becoming not only more frequent but also more technological. Instead of simple disconnections, situations are increasingly observed where the formal availability of communication conceals the real inaccessibility of services. For businesses and users, this means that the risks of digital disruptions are becoming a constant factor that must be prepared for in advance.