The constitutional referendum, the importance of which was emphasized by representatives of the authorities at all levels, has taken place. Its results, which appear justified to some and predictable to others, carry significant risks for the current government, as noted in the publication exclusive.kz.
On one hand, the voting results will allow the authorities to refute accusations of "illegitimacy," closing all speculations about possible "urgent" changes. At the same time, the scenario of President Tokayev's potential departure to the UN, although losing popularity, is still discussed online and occasionally mentioned in international media, as shown by a Reuters report.
President Tokayev, having just cast his ballot, told journalists that some analysts claim there is growing competition within the government and emerging alarming trends. However, according to him, there is no reason for concern that this will affect society. During several months of discussions on the constitutional draft, which was mistakenly interpreted as "nationwide," everything was done to dispel doubts regarding competition within the government or at least to create the appearance of its unity.
On the other hand, in the event of a worsening external economic situation, there may arise a need for radical changes in the power structure. The country's economy is currently in a vulnerable state, and the actions of the executive branch in response to these challenges do not inspire optimism among experts or ordinary citizens. The high level of approval for the new Constitution, resulting from the plebiscite, benefits the ruling class: they can now claim that the people themselves chose the path for the country, and we are all in the same boat. Otherwise, the referendum might not have been held at all—the new Constitution could have been adopted through parliament and then dissolved, replaced by the Kurultai. Nationwide voting, as a social contract, makes "us, the people of Kazakhstan," in a certain sense, hostages to the conditions of this agreement.
Another important question is whether this contract will be upheld by both parties? The answer to this depends primarily on the authorities. It will now be difficult for them to blame their mistakes on the "legacy of old Kazakhstan," which the president noted at a recent meeting with deputies of the maslikhats.
Although the Nazarbayev system continues to exist in practice, it has legally lost its power—now we are dealing with New Kazakhstan. This obliges the new architects of the system to take action. Kazakhstan is known as a country with a strong presidential system, where the head of state has significant powers.
The president determines key directions of domestic and foreign policy, influences the formation of the government, and parliamentary processes. Thus, Kazakhstan is effectively transitioning from Nazarbayev's super-presidential republic to Tokayev's, which is only partially changed.
This means that we can expect not radical, but only cosmetic changes in power, as well as personnel reshuffles in the interests of the new "client." In the political context, this may lead to the emergence of new parties, as the existing political formations, including the renamed "party of the parliamentary majority," are inherited from "old Kazakhstan."
Thus, there is a need to create a counterbalance that would appear more convincing to society than the current "living ecosystem" of parliamentary opposition. This will also help address the task of complete manageability of the elites, especially in the regions.
Among other things, a regional party representing the interests of local elites may emerge. It is worth noting that the Senate, once created to lobby for regional interests, has failed in this task, as has the vague Halyk Kenesi, which seems intended only to promote necessary bills for the supreme and executive powers.
Such a political tool of power is not only necessary; it is vital. Otherwise, local elites sitting in maslikhats may become a serious centrifugal force. Let us recall how, after the conflicts in Kordai, the then first deputy head of the Presidential Administration, Maulen Ashimbayev, called for a deep analysis of inter-elite and inter-ethnic situations in the regions to understand the effectiveness of public institutions.
The key point here is not so much the personalities as the institutions. The future parliamentary corps, based on party lists, may become only a "launch pad" for creating a competitive political market, a real multiparty system, rather than one "poured" from a single barrel.
President Tokayev once mentioned the need for such changes after the events in Kantar.
Despite changes in the rhetoric of the authorities, the task of finding inter-elite consensus remains relevant. It has been temporarily pushed to the background, but sooner or later it will become important again, as it is the inter-elite balance that ensures the stability and effectiveness of power. Based on such a balance, a cabinet of ministers can be formed that is capable of effectively managing the economy and supporting business while avoiding social risks.
It should be noted that none of this will happen "tomorrow." Constitutional reforms never lead to instant changes—they set new rules of the game, defining a "social contract." After the first constitutional referendum in 1995, the authorities quickly "forgot" about their obligations. At that time, they had an important trump card in the form of high raw material prices to suppress social tension.
Today, the situation for the Kazakh ruling class has changed significantly, and unfortunately, not for the better. The realization of the impossibility of returning to previous conditions prompted the president, as he noted at a briefing after the vote, to "begin developing a new Constitution about two years ago."
After the first referendum, the old elite remained, although it lost formal levers of influence. With the disappearance of the "Nazarbayev" Constitution, the new Basic Law became an attempt to lay the foundation for a new ruling elite—the "collective Tokayev." At the same time, critics of the authorities believe that Tokayev's constitution is ceasing to be perceived as a social contract and is becoming a mechanism that protects the authorities from future questions about the past. However, without such "insurance," the authorities become vulnerable, which increases risks for the entire country, especially in light of the growing pressure from our northern neighbor.
Thus, the Constitution-2026 remains far from ideal for a certain part of society, but it represents the result of a difficult choice made by the authorities, which society has no choice but to accept.
The post "Is the 'collective Tokayev' replacing the 'collective Nazarbayev'?" first appeared on K-News.
