The conflict in Ukraine has become a catalyst for changes in the military sphere, destroying conventional notions of combat. Classic strategies, such as tank wedges, have given way to modern methods based on the use of drones and digital systems. In the near future, we can expect even more significant transformations: the armies of the world are forced to adapt to conditions that previously seemed impossible. The beginning of the special military operation (SMO) in Ukraine was marked by outdated approaches, and retired Colonel Andrey Demurenko of the General Staff of Russia shared with Lenta.ru the lessons learned and how they have impacted military science.
"Lenta.ru": What factors have had a decisive influence on the change in the nature of warfare during the fighting in Ukraine?"
Andrey Demurenko: It is important to note that in 2022, Russia began the special military operation without a full understanding of its scale and specifics. Unfortunately, preparation in many areas was insufficient.
This is not an accusation but rather a problem of command, which failed to foresee numerous factors—from the formation of personnel reserves to legal support, including mobilization and the status of volunteer formations and private military companies (PMCs).
Some of these systemic problems remain unresolved to this day.
Military operations are still largely conducted according to old regulations, and operational planning is based on outdated theoretical models.
In other words, the beginning of the special military operation can be considered unsuccessful.
It is important to understand that neither the military nor the political leadership of Russia had experience in conducting a war of this type. Some high-ranking officers served in Afghanistan, others in Chechnya or Syria, but these conflicts were significantly different from what is happening now.
The theater of operations in Ukraine is unique: it includes large cities, industrial zones, villages, open fields, and forests.
Neither Russia nor the USSR has faced such conditions since World War II.
Thus, the answer is clear: new technologies and weapons played a crucial role.
— Can you elaborate?
— New technologies, along with the peculiarities of the theater of operations, have become key factors determining the tactics of both sides. First and foremost, this includes the mass use of reconnaissance and strike FPV drones, which have effectively taken on some of the artillery's functions. Strategic drones, such as "Geran," have begun to perform the tasks of long-range missiles.
The same applies to electronic reconnaissance and big data analysis from the battlefield. Previously, these systems did not play such a critical role.
It is also worth noting the use of artificial intelligence, which has begun to be implemented this year in conjunction with reconnaissance-strike complexes and for controlling swarms of UAVs.
The combat operations of 2022 and 2025 are significantly different from each other.
We prepared for actions with large formations, isolating areas with tank wedges—according to templates from the mid and late 20th century. But such a strategy proved to be practically unviable even then.
— So, have classic combined arms battles become a thing of the past? What has replaced them?
— Traditional concepts—such as "concentration of forces," "breakthrough area," "isolation of the combat zone"—have lost their previous significance.
Planning operations according to Cold War schemes or campaigns like Iraq in 2003 is no longer possible.
This also applies to staffing principles, organizational structure, and basic tactics.
For example, back in 1988, I published an article in a departmental journal criticizing the classic tactic of advancing with infantry chains under BMP cover—the basis of combined arms combat at that time. We, along with several other theorists, proposed implementing the tactics of mobile fire groups developed by the Americans in Vietnam: combat is conducted by small groups operating under the cover of precision weapons and adjacent units.
The district commander ridiculed these ideas and published a refutation. And up until the start of the SMO, the army continued to adhere to old approaches.
— But now this tactic has become the basis for offensive actions...
— That's right; it is used by both Russian and Ukrainian troops.
The problem is that these principles are still not reflected in official regulations. This means that soldiers, especially conscripts, continue to be trained according to outdated schemes.
— How has the role of technology and fire support changed under these conditions?
— The offensive with large armored groups has been replaced by operations from closed firing positions: technology now serves to support infantry.
Platoon and company commanders regulate fire by observing the battlefield through UAV cameras and using tablets to calculate coordinates. Thus, strike drones and precision artillery have become the primary tools for direct engagement, while frontline equipment serves as their cover and means for advancing success. This completely changes the classic tactical doctrine.
Today, it is impossible to concentrate significant forces on the battlefield. Even a few tanks or a small column in the rear will be instantly detected by electronic reconnaissance and destroyed by drones.
The concentration of forces, which was once the foundation of military science, has turned into a vulnerability. Now, maximum dispersion and constant movement are required.
This changes the entire logic of unit management and operation planning.
— Does this also apply to artillery?
— Absolutely! Classic "counter-battery warfare" in the traditional sense has become a thing of the past. Artillery no longer deploys in batteries at stationary positions.
It would be more accurate to speak of "counter-artillery warfare": a duel of one gun against another or against a system with high precision.
After a few shots, the crew must immediately change position; otherwise, they will be destroyed.
— How well are these principles applied in practice?
— The reality on the battlefield always outpaces theory. Assault units are forced to "bite" through defenses in small, highly professional groups. This applies to both urban combat and fighting in open fields and forests.
Every fighter must be a versatile specialist: they operate a grenade launcher, engage in demining, and manage a drone to adjust fire. Covering groups must master different types of precision weapons. The requirements for the training of each fighter have significantly increased compared to the recent past.
On the front line, it is necessary to meet new conditions, despite outdated guidelines and training programs in the rear.
It is important to note that this primarily applies to the European theater of operations. In the desert, taiga, or jungles, the key principles will be different.
— Do the political goals of the military operation influence the nature of combat operations?
— Absolutely. Political goals are primary. For example, if Israel seeks to prevent a nuclear threat from Iran, it will not deploy ground troops but will limit itself to airstrikes. This is also true for Russia.
The ultimate political goal determines both the scale and the form of the use of force.
— How has the command system for troops on the front line changed?
— The command system has undergone significant changes. In general, the operational command level is practically excluded from the decision-making process. Essentially, only two levels remain—tactical and strategic.
This means that planning and direct combat management are carried out at the level of the company commander or, at best, the battalion.
Involving higher authorities is often pointless.
I’ll explain. A brigade, corps, or operational group commander, considering the scale of their responsibility, does not possess the volume of "immediate" data that officers on the front line have. They physically cannot effectively plan maneuvers of large forces in real-time. And it’s not their fault—the very concentration of such forces has become mortally dangerous.
Thus, initiative and responsibility shift downward—to those who see the battlefield through drone cameras and tablet terminals.
At the same time, strikes on strategically significant targets—bridges, warehouses, energy system nodes, and other elements of critical infrastructure—are still planned and sanctioned at the level of the highest military-political leadership.
The tactical level fights for positions, while the operational level loses its classic significance, and the strategic level defines long-term objectives.
This model reflects the essence of modern high-intensity warfare: decentralization of tactics while maintaining centralized strategic control.
— How has the approach to logistics and supply changed?
— The approach to logistics has undergone radical changes, especially in the frontline zone. In the deep rear—hundreds of kilometers from the front—the system has generally remained the same: cargo is delivered by train and large motor convoys, and transport hubs operate according to old schemes.
However, as one approaches the front line, the situation changes. Forming columns, even 10-20 kilometers from the front, has become extremely dangerous.
Now, delivering ammunition, food, and medical supplies to trenches and strongholds can only be done in small batches, mainly at night.
On the last stretch, soldiers often carry cargo manually—this is called "caravans." Assault troops have it even harder: no one will bring ammunition to the gray zone until the group secures it. Therefore, fighters sometimes have to haul 40-50 kilograms of gear—and that may not be enough.
The reason is the active use of drones and reconnaissance assets. Warehouses near the front had to be broken down into many micro-warehouses, and supply points had to be dispersed. The logistics of the last mile are built not on the principle of efficiency but on survivability and stealth.
— What role do drones play in this new system?
— Even if the sky is completely cleared of enemy drones, the pace of advancement will not increase, as the drone is just one element of precision assets.
The main burden still falls on the infantry. It is impossible to replace them with drones.
It doesn’t matter whether you are facing a professional mercenary or a conscript; in close combat and seizing positions, you will still have to rely on infantry. UAVs cannot perform this task.
Nevertheless, combating drones has become one of the most complex and critically important tasks on the battlefield. And, paradoxically, the most effective way to fight enemy drones is with other drones—a kind of "air defense drones" that intercept and destroy larger UAVs.
— How has the psychological state of the fighter changed? What qualities have become critical for task execution and survival?
— I admit, even I, the son of a front-line soldier and a person who has been through several hot spots, have been surprised by the modern generation of fighters—in a positive sense. During the special military operation, I served in one of the units of the Volunteer Corps. The fighters there are, in a way, maximalists.
They are desperate, recklessly brave, and incredibly resilient. They are not just people; they are true fighters.
These qualities are fundamental, and they are universal for all times. But the skills have changed. The modern soldier needs to act differently: to meet contemporary requirements for camouflage, to operate UAVs, and to adjust fire. New skills emerge in any war—this was also the case in the Great Patriotic War when simply being proficient with a rifle was no longer considered sufficient.
A key point becomes continuous training and technological literacy.
The modern fighter is not just a shooter. They are simultaneously an operator, a scout, and a sapper.
This is not a novelty. It has always been this way: the bayonet fight gave way to trenches and artillery, then tanks and aviation. Each technological leap raises new skill requirements. New conflicts will inevitably demand new abilities.
— How has the special military operation changed perceptions of the military-industrial potential of the state?
— For 35 years, Russian military leadership relied on the industrial logic of war and prepared material reserves for a large conflict. However, mistakes were made along the way. It was assumed that large stocks of equipment and ammunition were stored and ready for immediate use. The reality turned out to be different: a significant portion of the reserves proved to be unfit for combat. This was a serious miscalculation.
Nevertheless, conclusions have been drawn. Issues of real material reserves are now under control at the highest level.
The main task now is to forecast the development of modern warfare and adapt the defense industry to new requirements.
In recent years, the economy has demonstrated a high capacity for adaptation: from providing basic equipment to deploying mass production of drones. Progress is particularly noticeable in tactical gear—load-bearing vests, bulletproof vests, sights, and night vision devices. Modernization is ongoing.
The future of high-tech systems will depend on how well the experience of their use is reflected in combat regulations and technical manuals.
— What else is important to consider?
— The readiness of industrial enterprises. In military economics, there is a concept of "warm production": in peacetime, conveyor lines produce goods in small batches, improving samples, but can switch to mass production if necessary.
This flexibility and ability for rapid mobilization provide a strategic advantage in a prolonged high-intensity conflict.
— What role do private manufacturers and volunteer initiatives play?
— It is important to distinguish between the ongoing production of private defense companies and the situational efforts of volunteer projects.
The overall trend is clear: the future lies with decentralized production networks. The role of subcontractors will only grow.
The main task is to systematize, standardize, and integrate this production into the overall logistics and supply system.
This trend is characteristic of all leading armies in the world. The USA has long been on this path. The exceptions are China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). However, China has not engaged in large-scale wars recently, and it is unclear how viable its centralized model will be. The DPRK reportedly continues to face serious problems in producing modern and high-tech systems.
— How has the current conflict highlighted the limits of military alliances like NATO or the CSTO—in organizational and political terms?
— I want to emphasize: this is just my personal opinion. By virtue of my service, I have had to interact with representatives of NATO command, and I can say that the classic bloc system is fading away.
It is being replaced by the logic of nation-states that create situational military-political alliances for specific tasks.
This is not a "multipolar" world but rather a "multi-polar" one, where there are several centers of power, but none of them is firmly established.
NATO and the CSTO are already experiencing erosion. The interests of their members do not align, and internal contradictions are growing, despite the rhetoric of unity.
Future alliances may be built on various foundations—from confessional to economic.
This is already happening. For example, Turkey is pursuing its own expansion in the Middle East and the Caucasus, ignoring NATO's position.
— This picture indeed resembles the second half of the 19th century...
— Yes, world politics is cyclical.
When the USA stops giving NATO primary attention, the alliance, in my opinion, will meet the fate of the Warsaw Pact Organization (WPO). The Eastern bloc was sustained by the resources and political will of the USSR.
New coalitions and situational alliances will emerge, forming and dissolving quite rapidly in response to changes in the international situation. A fresh example is the strategic partnership between Russia and the DPRK.
This is a model for the future: not eternal blocs but flexible alliances for specific tasks.
— How will the global military doctrine of Russia change in this logic?
— It all depends on the depth of analysis of the current war. I believe that its active phase at this stage of geopolitical confrontation is nearing completion.
After a major conflict, there is always a period of reflection. In the 1920s, the USSR did a tremendous job studying the experiences of World War I and the Civil War, which produced a number of brilliant military theorists. A similar process occurred in the USA after operations in Iraq in the 2000s and 2010s—the analysis began even before the formal end of hostilities.
We need such a process: comprehensive analysis, formulation of recommendations, and then reform. On this basis, all doctrines, including the global one, should be revised.
But there is a problem: a significant portion of the senior military leadership consists of old-school individuals whose views are sometimes too conservative. One can still hear the opinion that future wars will revert to the principles of large formations from the last century, and we need to prepare for actions strictly according to the regulations of the 20th century.
I categorically disagree with this viewpoint.
The doctrine of the future cannot be retrospective. It must be based on the lessons of the present, even if those lessons are painful.
— How relevant are the classics of military science—Sun Tzu, Carl von Clausewitz, Alexander Svechin? Have they become outdated in the age of drones and AI?
— The basic principles articulated by the classics do not lose their relevance. They are universal. The question is not their significance but the correct understanding of them. Their strength lies in recognizing the laws of war: the relationship between goals and means, the importance of the moral factor, the fog of war.
The classics have not become outdated—the dogmatic, literal understanding of their works has.
Those who see in them only the experience of the past will lose, just as those who follow them too literally will.
— How do you envision combat operations in two to three years? What key moments may arise in the near future?
— I insist that the active phase of the current conflict is highly likely to conclude within a few months. However, this does not mean that the remaining part of Ukraine will become a friendly or neutral country. The threat of a resumption of full-scale hostilities in this direction will remain.
The trends we have discussed will only intensify in the coming years. A key factor will be not only technologies but also weapons based on new physical principles.
The strategic advantage will go to the side that first makes a qualitative leap in this area.
We are talking about drones with power plants that allow them to stay in the air for hours, next-generation hypersonic systems, and new types of precision weapons. The turning point will not be the mere appearance of such systems but their mass application and integration into unified reconnaissance-strike networks.
It is necessary to rethink the role of tanks and heavy equipment, to develop new precision-guided grenade launchers. We face many complex but solvable tasks.
The war in two to three years will become even more remote, high-tech, and less "humanized" on the front lines.
To maintain parity and move towards superiority, Russia will need to make significant efforts to adapt to this new reality.
