According to data published in the State Register of Judicial Acts, the accused, Batyr [name changed K.B.E.], in April 2024, being aware that the SIM box [a device for manipulating mobile numbers] was used in fraudulent schemes operating in the shadow cryptocurrency and telecommunications sectors, contacted a person referred to as "H.V." via messenger.
The investigation established that Batyr did not exercise due caution in assessing the legality of the equipment's use, did not verify its purpose, and did not enter into contracts with official communication providers, indicating a conscious violation of the law. At the direction of an unknown person with the pseudonym H.V., he, lacking legal grounds, obtained SIM cards from mobile operators, which were delivered through unidentified couriers, whose names he concealed. This concealment of information complicated the identification of individuals involved in the distribution of SIM cards, which is classified as hiding data important for the investigation of a serious crime.
After connecting the SIM box to a laptop and the internet, Batyr installed remote access software on his computer, allowing H.V. to control the equipment remotely. This created conditions for constant access to the network through various subscriber numbers registered to front individuals and used in fraudulent schemes. Understanding that this equipment served for mass registration and activation of accounts on social networks and financial platforms, as well as for deceiving people, Batyr continued to use the SIM box and receive illegal rewards. He periodically replaced SIM cards, destroying the used ones by flushing them down the toilet or burying them in the foundations of construction sites, thereby destroying evidence and complicating the investigation.
The accused, being aware that illegal monetary operations were being conducted through the SIM box, including against the victim E.P., did not report the incident to law enforcement and continued to use the equipment in the interests of H.V., acting for selfish purposes and concealing information about the transfer of SIM cards, sources of incoming funds, and channels for withdrawing money.
Moreover, according to data from the communication operator, the number used on the SIM box was active just before the withdrawal of 65 thousand dollars from the account of the victim E.P. This, at the current exchange rate of the National Bank, amounts to about 5 million 655 thousand soms, which is a significant loss.
The investigative authorities established that Batyr, having all the information about the nature of the crimes and the involvement of foreign citizens, including H.V., as well as the use of cryptocurrencies to mask the traces of crimes, did not report this to law enforcement but, on the contrary, continued to facilitate criminal activity.
The criminals, acting through remote software, deceived victims, including E.P., and urged them to transfer money to accounts controlled by the criminal group.
The scheme for withdrawing funds was carried out as follows: the money transferred by the victims initially went to accounts in cryptocurrency wallets registered to front individuals. After converting the cryptocurrency into cash or redirecting it through exchange points, the funds were withdrawn to bank cards issued to front individuals with concealed data.
The communication necessary to confirm transfers and carry out fraudulent actions was conducted precisely through the SIM cards connected to the SIM box, allowing the criminals to change numbers multiple times and maintain anonymity. During the search, a CD was found containing data from communication operators confirming that the activity of the numbers used in fraudulent actions was recorded at Batyr's residence, where the SIM box was located. Thus, the SIM box was a key element ensuring the organization of the fraudulent scheme, the withdrawal of funds, and the concealment of traces of criminal activity.
As a result of the pre-trial proceedings, Batyr's actions were classified under part 1 of article 367 of the Criminal Code as concealing a serious crime. The Oktyabrsky District Court of Bishkek found him guilty under part 1 of article 376 of the Criminal Code and imposed a fine of 350 calculation indicators, which amounts to 35 thousand soms in favor of the state.
The measure of restraint in the form of a travel ban is subject to cancellation after the verdict enters into legal force.
Dissatisfied with the verdict, the senior assistant prosecutor of the Oktyabrsky District filed an appeal, stating that the court did not take into account the importance of compensating the victim's damages. The damages in this case were not compensated, while one of the key tasks of criminal legislation is to protect the rights of victims and restore the material damage caused.
Furthermore, the prosecutor noted that the punishment imposed by the court is too lenient and does not correspond to the degree of public danger of the crime. He requested that the verdict be overturned and that Batyr be given a stricter punishment under part 1 of article 367 of the Criminal Code.
At the first-instance court hearing, Batyr admitted his guilt in the incriminated act, explaining that in 2019-2021 in Moscow, he met Sultan, who offered him remote work through a messenger, connecting him with H.V.
In April 2024, Batyr received equipment from Hasim, which he installed at his home and connected to the internet. The setup was done remotely. Hasim regularly sent SIM cards, about 50 in total, which Batyr installed in the SIM box, for which he received 60 dollars monthly. Gradually, he began to suspect the illegality of his actions, especially after the number of SIM cards increased and he received threats.
Later, he removed the SIM cards and partially ceased their use, destroying the used SIM cards.
The victim E.P. testified in the first-instance court that after seeing an advertisement, she followed a link and communicated with people who introduced themselves as company employees. Under their influence, she registered on the website, deposited money, and began to receive supposedly income. She corresponded with a "financial analyst" D.G., who convinced her to transfer large sums, totaling about 65 thousand dollars. When she tried to withdraw the funds, she was denied, citing the need to pay a tax and compensation for a "negative balance," after which threats began to arrive. She realized that she had become a victim of fraudsters and contacted law enforcement, asking the court to send the case to the prosecutor for requalifying Batyr's actions from concealing a crime to fraud and for compensation of damages.
Witness Sh.A.I. reported that a transfer of 69 thousand soms was received on his account from citizen P.E. He is engaged in arbitrage trading of the cryptocurrency USDT and explained that the funds were transferred as part of a deal to purchase cryptocurrency.
Witness A.M., who works at a cellular company, stated that his duties include detecting fraud and interacting with law enforcement. He explained that a GSM gateway is a device for transmitting calls and SMS through cellular networks, often used in offices and call centers. When using a GSM gateway, an international call is disguised as a local one, leading to significant losses for communication operators and posing a threat to national security.
Witness I.D.V. reported that funds were received on his account from citizen P.E. in the amount of 166 thousand soms as part of a deal for selling USDT.
Having reviewed the case materials, the judicial panel of the Bishkek City Court upheld the verdict of the Oktyabrsky District on October 8, 2025. The prosecutor's appeal was rejected.
The verdict enters into legal force immediately and can be appealed to the Supreme Court.
