In the context of escalating conflict with Israel and the US, Iran's position demonstrates that it is not striving for a traditional victory. Its primary goal is survival, and it intends to achieve this on its own terms.
The leaders of the Islamic Republic have been preparing for such circumstances for several years.
They realized that their ambitions in the region could lead to conflict with Israel or the US, and that war with one of these countries would almost inevitably involve the other. This pattern was vividly demonstrated during the 12-day war last year when Israel launched an attack, and the US joined in a few days later.
This time, both adversaries have simultaneously begun striking Iran.
Given the technological superiority and military capabilities of the US and Israel, it would be a mistake to assume that Iranian strategists are aiming for an easy victory on the battlefield.
Rather, Iran seems to have chosen a strategy based on endurance and deterrence. Over the past ten years, the country has significantly invested in developing multi-layered ballistic missile systems, long-range drones, and creating allied armed groups throughout the region.
Israel is aware of its limitations: the territory of the continental US is beyond the reach of Iranian missiles, but American bases in neighboring Arab countries are at risk.
Moreover, Iran has the capability to attack Israel with missiles and drones, and recent incidents have shown that Israel's air defense systems can be overcome. Every projectile that penetrates these systems carries not only military but also psychological impact.
Iranian calculations also take into account the economic aspects of war. The interceptors used by Israel and the US are significantly more expensive than many of the drones and missiles in Iran's arsenal. A prolonged conflict forces the US and Israel to spend significant resources intercepting relatively inexpensive Iranian targets.
Additionally, energy resources represent another important aspect of the military economy.
The Strait of Hormuz is a key hub for oil and gas supplies, and Iran does not necessarily have to completely block this waterway in the Persian Gulf. Even the threat of its blockade or minor disruptions in supply already lead to price increases, which, in turn, can intensify international pressure and calls for de-escalation.
Thus, the escalation of the conflict may serve as a tool not for the military defeat of adversaries, but for increasing the cost of continuing the war.
This brings us to possible attacks on neighboring countries.
Missile and drone strikes on states such as Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman, and Iraq are apparently intended to demonstrate that the presence of American troops in the region carries risks.
Tehran may hope that the governments of these countries will pressure Washington to limit or cease military operations; however, such a strategy is dangerous. An expansion of attacks may only increase hostility and push these countries to strengthen ties with the US and Israel.
The long-term consequences of such actions could lead to a shift in regional alliances, ultimately further oppressing Iran.
If survival is the primary goal, then increasing the number of enemies is a risky step. But for Tehran, restraint may appear equally dangerous, as it can be perceived as weakness.
Reports that local commanders may independently choose targets or launch missiles raise additional questions.
If this is the case, it does not necessarily indicate a collapse of command structures. Iran's military doctrine, especially within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), has long included decentralized elements, allowing for continued operations under conditions of mass attacks.
Communication may be vulnerable to interception and suppression, and high-profile commanders become targets. Air superiority by the US and Israel limits centralized control. In such conditions, coordinated target lists and delegated authority may be deliberate precautions against the complete destruction of command.
This may explain how Iranian forces continue to operate even after the elimination of high-profile IRGC figures and even after the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's supreme leader, as a result of the initial strikes by the US and Israel on Saturday.
However, decentralization also carries risks. Local commanders, lacking complete information, may attack unintended targets, including states that seek to maintain neutrality.
The absence of a unified operational picture increases the likelihood of mistakes. If this continues for an extended period, it could lead to a loss of control.
Ultimately, Iran's strategy appears to be based on the belief that it can withstand strikes longer than its adversaries will be willing to endure the consequences.
If this is indeed the case, then it represents a form of calculated escalation: to endure, respond, avoid total collapse, and wait for political disagreements to arise among adversaries.
However, such endurance has its limits. Missile stocks are limited, and production capabilities are constantly under attack. Mobile launchers can be destroyed during movement, and their replacement takes time.
The same logic applies to Iran's adversaries.
Israel cannot fully rely on its air defense systems. Every penetration causes public concern. The US must consider the risk of regional escalation, the volatility of the energy market, and the financial costs of prolonged operations.
Both sides seem to believe that time is on their side. However, this cannot be true for both sides simultaneously.
In this war, the Islamic Republic is not striving for victory — its task is simply to survive.
The question of whether this goal can be achieved without ultimately alienating its neighbors remains open.
